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COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE OF TEXAS
MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDS UNDER
SECTION 523(a)(5) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE:
RETHINKING IN RE NUNNALLY
by Blake L. Berryman
ECTION 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code' states that a debtor's 2
discharge in bankruptcy will not affect the debtor's liability on debts
for alimony, maintenance, or support of a former spouse. 3 In this way
Congress has sought to balance the competing policies of ensuring that the
debtor's family, often completely dependent upon the debtor for its support,
is not left destitute by the debtor's bankruptcy, and of seeing that the debtor
receives a financial fresh start on life.4 This Comment discusses how courts
1. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West 1979 & Pam. Supp. 1987).
2. In this Comment, "debtor" refers to a person who has filed a petition in bankruptcy.
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1982).
3. Section 523(a) provides:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, main-
tenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or
property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that-
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law,
or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26)
of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to
the Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision of
such State); or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or
support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, main-
tenance, or support ....
II U.S.C.A. § 523(a) (West 1979 & Pam. Supp. 1987).
4. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1983); Brock v.
Barlow (In re Brock), 58 Bankr. 797, 806 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986); B. WEINTRAUB & A.
RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 3.09[5], at 3-45 (rev. ed. 1986); Recent Develop-
ments-Section 523(a)(5): The Exception From Discharge of Alimony, Maintenance and Sup-
port Obligations, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 109,109 (1987). The notion of the fresh start has long
provided the guiding theme of bankruptcy law. The goal is often stated as "giv[ing] to the
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decide whether or not a given property award is dischargeable in bankruptcy
under section 523(a)(5), and how they should decide. Primary attention falls
on the decisions of the Fifth Circuit and of the bankruptcy courts within it,
as they apply section 523(a)(5) to the divisions and obligations that Texas
matrimonial property law allows divorce courts to order. This Comment
first briefly summarizes the marital property law of Texas. Focusing on the
leading Fifth Circuit case on the subject, In re Nunnally,5 the Comment
examines the history and current status of the alimony exception to dis-
charge in bankruptcy. The Comment then investigates the Sixth Circuit's
innovative approach to the problem in In re Calhoun. 6 Finally, the Com-
ment concludes by urging the Fifth Circuit to replace Nunnally with a modi-
fied Calhoun-type approach that one bankruptcy court in Texas has already
endorsed. 7
I. TEXAS MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDS ON DIVORCE
Texas law divides all property that either or both spouses own into three
categories: the husband's separate property, the wife's separate property,
and the spouses' community property. 8 A spouse's separate property in-
cludes any property that the spouse owned before marriage, any property
acquired during marriage by gift or inheritance, and any recovery for per-
sonal injury to the spouse during marriage except recovery that represents
the spouse's diminished earning power during marriage.9 Community prop-
erty consists of all other property that either spouse acquires during
marriage. 1o
The Texas Family Code authorizes a court in a divorce proceeding to
make an equitable division of the spouses' property."I The Code does not
honest but unfortunate debtor ... a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); see Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985).
The question arises, however, as to what role the bankruptcy courts are to play in the bal-
ancing of polices. See infra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.
5. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
6. 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
7. See Holland v. Holland (In re Holland), 48 Bankr. 874, 876-77 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1984).
8. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
9. Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a) (Vernon 1975). In addition, separate property
includes property that is traceable to previously held separate property. See McKinley v. Mc-
Kinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1973); Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6, 10-11 (1851); Snider v.
Snider, 613 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ). For a fuller discussion of the
tracing principle, see J. McKNIGHT & W. REPPY, TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW 38-
47 (1983).
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975).
11. Id. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:
(a) In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the
estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due
regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.
(b) In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall also order a division of
the following real and personal property, wherever situated, in a manner that
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require that a court divide the property equally between the spouses. 12 In
dividing the marital property between the spouses, the court is to weigh the
equities of the parties, including fault in the breakup of the marriage and
each spouse's probable ability to meet future needs.13 Without a showing of
some abuse of discretion an appellate court will not disturb a divorce court's
division of property. 1 4 Texas divorce courts possess a broad range of options
in allocating property between the spouses. The court need not actually di-
vide each form of property into two parts; it can award one kind of property
to one spouse and another kind to the other.1 5 The court can order property
sold and the proceeds divided.16 It can award an indivisible type of property
to one spouse and a money judgment to the other, securing payment of the
judgment with a lien on the property given to one spouse.' 7 One important
limitation on the court's power to divide marital property, however, is that
only community property is subject to division; each spouse keeps his or her
own separate property.' 8
Texas is the only state in the Union that does not allow permanent, court-
ordered alimony. 19 The two adjectives modifying "alimony" in the preced-
ing sentence are important: Texas law permits a court to order temporary
support payments to either spouse, 20 and will enforce a contractual obliga-
tion to pay alimony. 2 ' The Texas Supreme Court has declared that ordering
the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party
and any children of the marriage:
(1) property that was acquired by either spouse while domiciled elsewhere
and that would have been community property if the spouse who acquired the
property had been domiciled in this state at the time of the acquisition; or
(2) property that was acquired by either spouse in exchange for real or per-
sonal property, and that would have been community property if the spouse
who acquired the property so exchanged had been domiciled in this state at the
time of its acquisition.
12. Price v. Price, 591 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ); Horlock v.
Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
13. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981). The court noted:
[T]he trial court may consider such factors as the spouses' capacities and abil-
ities, benefits which the party not at fault would have derived from continuation
of the marriage, business opportunities, education, relative physical conditions,
relative financial condition and obligations, disparity of ages, size of separate
estates, and the nature of the property.
Id.; see also McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413,
433-34 (1976) (lists additional factors for consideration).
14. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698; McKnight, supra note 13, at 435.
15. J. MCKNIGHT & W. REPPY, supra note 9, at 272.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Tex. 1977) (holding that separate
realty is not subject to division); Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 219-20 (Tex. 1982)
(extending Eggemeyer to include separate personalty).
19. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 218 n.7 (Tex. 1982); McKnight, supra notel3,
at 422.
20. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.59 (Vernon Supp. 1987). These payments must end, how-
ever, upon rendition of the final divorce decree. Id.
21. McKnight, supra note 13, at 422. The contractual support obligation becomes part of
the divorce decree by virtue of § 3.631 of the Family Code, provided the court finds the agree-
ment to be "just and right." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987). The
Texas Supreme Court has defined the term "alimony," for purposes of the proscription against
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post-divorce alimony is contrary to the statutes and public policy of the State
of Texas. 22 On the other hand, a mere money judgment in favor of one
former spouse is not necessarily void as an award of alimony. Such a judg-
ment is valid if it is traceable to property that the obligor spouse holds at the
end of the marriage. 23
II. THE ALIMONY EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Historically
At common law and in the bankruptcy statutes the debtor's obligation to
provide financial support for a spouse and children has always escaped the
effect of discharge in bankruptcy. 24 As one commentator has indicated, the
courts have viewed family support less as a debt and more of a moral duty
that should survive beyond the debtor's discharge.25 The Bankruptcy Act of
189826 in its original form made no express reference to spouse and child
support as excepted from discharge. In 1901, however, the United States
Supreme Court held in Audubon v. Shufeldt 27 that debts for alimony were
not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 28 Two years later, Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Act to exclude alimony and child support from the effect of
discharge.29
it, as "an allowance for support and sustenance of the wife, periodic or in gross, which a court
orders a husband to pay .... Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1967) (emphasis in
original).
22. Francis, 412 S.W.2d at 32.
23. Price v. Price, 591 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ). The court
declared:
[T]he trial court may require one party to make monetary payments to the other
after a divorce, so long as a division was referable to the rights and equities of
the parties in and to the properties at the time of the dissolution of the marriage.
In such a case, the courts have held that the division is not an allowance of
permanent alimony in violation of the established public policy.
Id.; see Francis, 412 S.W.2d at 32-33.
24. In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 174 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a) (West
1979 & Pam. Supp. 1987); Ravin & Rosen, The Dischargeability in Bankruptcy of Alimony,
Maintenance and Support Obligations, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 (1986).
25. Comment, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Dischargeability of Obligations In-
curred Under Property Settlements, Separation Agreements, and Divorce Decrees, 12 U. BALT.
L. REV. 520, 520 (1983).
26. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
27. 181 U.S. 575 (1901).
28. Id. at 578. The Court reasoned that alimony was not a debt in the ordinary sense of
the word:
Alimony does not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of
marriage. It is not founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural
and legal duty of the husband to support the wife .... Permanent alimony is
regarded rather as a portion of the husband's estate to which the wife is equita-
bly entitled, than as strictly a debt ....
Id. at 577-78.
29. Act of February 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 797, 798. Section 17(a) of the amended act
provided: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,
except such as ... (2) are ... for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support
of wife or child . I..." Id.
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B. Under the Bankruptcy Code
Congress completely revamped the bankruptcy laws with the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.30 This alteration occurred largely to accommodate
changes in the commercial environment, including the widespread adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code and the explosion of consumer credit. 31
Congress retained the alimony exception to discharge in section 523(a)(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code. 32 Section 523(a)(5) did differ, however, from section
17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in several respects. First, Congress
changed the word "wife" in section 17(a)(7) to "spouse" to remove lingering
doubts as to the old provision's constitutionality.33 Second, Congress added
language referring to former spouses, to make it clear that section 523(a)(5)
excepted from discharge obligations extending beyond dissolution of the
marriage. 34 One bankruptcy court has identified a third difference between
section 17(a)(7) of the old Bankruptcy Act and section 523(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 35 The court noted that under section 17(a)(7) obligations
imposed in a divorce decree were nondischargeable if considerations of sup-
port played any significant role in the determination of the award. 36 Section
523(a)(5), by contrast, requires that the award be "actually in the nature of"
alimony or support to be excepted from discharge, or essentially for the pur-
pose of supporting the obligee former spouse.37
Under the Bankruptcy Code either the debtor or the obligee former
spouse can file a complaint to determine whether an obligation created upon
divorce is dischargeable. 38 The obligee former spouse need not assert
nondischargeability in the bankruptcy case. Unlike the discharge exceptions
contained in paragraphs (2), (4), and (6) of section 523(a), which the creditor
waives if he fails to assert them in the bankruptcy court, a former spouse can
assert an exception to discharge under section 523(a)(5) at any time.39 The
burden of persuasion rests with the party asserting nondischargeability. 4o
30. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326
(1982)).
31. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5787, 5788.
32. See supra note 3. Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, of which § 523(a)(5) is a part,
applies to all bankruptcy cases that parties bring under chapter 7, 11, or 13 of the Code. 11
U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 596, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 5967.
33. See In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1234 (5th Cir. 1980) (section 17(a) as written denies
husbands equal protection of the laws), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981).
34. In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 174 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
35. Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980).
36. Id.
37. See supra note 3; Fox, 5 Bankr. at 320. The Fox court concluded that this change
should make it more difficult for an obligee former spouse to prove the alimony exception
under § 523(a)(5) than under section 17(a). Fox, 5 Bankr. at 320. In In re Teter, 14 Bankr.
434, 436 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981), the court, although citing Fox favorably, required only that
support considerations "play a part" in the creation of the obligation for a court to except it
from discharge under § 523(a)(5).
38. See BANKR. R. 4007(a).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1982); BANKR. R. 4007(b); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
523.15[6] (15th ed. 1986); Ravin & Rosen, supra note 24, at 4.
40. In re Benich, 811 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1987); Long v. West (In re Long), 794 F.2d
1987]
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In deciding whether a certain award of property arising from a divorce
constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support within the meaning of section
523(a)(5), the courts observe two fundamental principles of law. The first is
that the substance of the award, not its form, will determine dis-
chargeability. 41 The courts generally begin their analysis by trying to dis-
cern the underlying purpose of the obligation in question, and whether the
parties considered the support needs of the recipient spouse in creating the
debt. 42 Consequently, the divorce court's designation of the award in the
divorce decree will not control the bankruptcy court's decision regarding
dischargeability. 43
The second general principle, related to the first, declares that federal, not
state, law will decide whether a property award is alimony, maintenance, or
support and, therefore, nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5). 44 Under
the old Bankruptcy Act the opposite was true as state law often controlled. 45
The policy of letting state law govern issues of bankruptcy, however, led to
the establishment of different standards for alimony, maintenance, and sup-
port in different states and impaired Congress's ability to provide uniform
bankruptcy laws.46 Still, most bankruptcy courts do not ignore state domes-
tic-relations law entirely, but look to it for guidance in deciding whether the
divorce court intended the award to be for the support of the recipient for-
mer spouse.4 7 The bankruptcy court examines state-law criteria for award-
928, 930 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Tosti, 62 Bankr. 131, 133 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); Carlile v. Fox
(In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980). The burden of persuasion is the same
if the obligee ex-spouse sues in state court to collect on the obligation, even though discharge
in bankruptcy stands as an affirmative defense in Texas. See Harbour v. Harbour, 590 S.W.2d
828, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
834 (1980); TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
41. Ravin & Rosen, supra note 24, at 7.
42. Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980); Harris v.
Harris, 605 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. Hack v. Laney (In re Laney), 53 Bankr. 231, 235 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); Carlile v.
Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980); Hoffman & Murray, Obligations
That Cannot Be Erased, FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1983, at 19. Although the divorce court's
characterization of the debt is not res judicata, Fox, 5 Bankr. at 319-20, the divorce court's
determination of the existence and amount of the debt becomes binding on the parties through
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733-34 (1946); In re
Comer, 27 Bankr. 1018, 1021-22 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1984).
On the other hand, bankruptcy courts often consider the label attached to the award as a clue
to the parties' intent. See Long v. West (In re Long), 794 F.2d 928, 931 (4th Cir. 1986); In re
Anderson, 62 Bankr. 448, 454 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); Comment, supra note 25, at 521.
44. Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Holland v. Holland
(In re Holland), 48 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
523.15[l] (15th ed. 1986). The legislative history on this point is clear: "What constitutes
alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined under the bankruptcy law, not State
law." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5963, 6320.
45. See In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447, 448-49 (6th Cir. 1974); B. WEINTRAUB & A. RES-
NICK, supra note 4, 3.09[5]; Note, Bankruptcy.- Dischargeability of Divorce-Related Expenses
Under 11 US.C. § 523(a)(5), 35 OKLA. L. REV. 799, 800, 806 (1982).
46. In re Yeates, 44 Bankr. 575, 578 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986);
see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress's power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws); Id.
art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause).
47. In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 877-78 (10th Cir. 1986); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun),
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ing alimony or support. If these criteria were present at the time the divorce
court rendered its decree, the bankruptcy court is more likely to find the
obligation in question to be alimony, maintenance, or support, and therefore
nondischargeable. 48 Reference to state law appears appropriate, since the
underlying obligation is a product of state law.49
1. The Intent/Factor Approach
The determining question in a proceeding based on section 523(a)(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code asks whether the obligation in dispute is "actually in
the nature of" alimony or support.50 If the award is not one of support, but
merely a division of property, section 523(a)(5) does not apply, and a dis-
charge will relieve the debtor of personal liability on the debt.51 The bank-
ruptcy courts have resorted to several methods to determine which
obligations between former spouses are nondischargable under section
523(a)(5). The majority of courts today use the intent/factor approach. 52
Under this view, the intent of the divorce court, or of the spouses in the case
of a property settlement, becomes crucial. The bankruptcy court will find
the award in question nondischargeable only if it finds that the parties to the
decree intended the award to serve as support for the recipient former
spouse.5 3 The courts discern the parties' intent by applying a variety of fac-
tors, many of which constitute the same factors that state courts use in
awarding alimony or dividing community property.54 Different bankruptcy
courts enunciate different factors, but no one factor is dispositive. 55
One factor is the language that the divorce decree or property settlement
uses. The bankruptcy court is likely to find an award that a decree or settle-
715 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (6th Cir. 1983); Holland v. Holland (In re Holland), 48 Bankr. 874,
876 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984).
48. Holland v. Holland (In re Holland), 48 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984).
49. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1108 (6th Cir. 1983); Ravin &
Rosen, supra note 24, at 12. Furthermore, state law can provide clues to the parties' intent in
concluding a particular agreement, since presumably the parties knew and intended the legal
consequences of their dealings. In re Delaine, 56 Bankr. 460, 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982).
51. In re Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667, 674 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985); In re Bedingfield, 42 Bankr.
641, 645 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Harbour v. Harbour, 590 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980); Ravin & Rosen,
supra note 24, at 2.
52. Ravin & Rosen, supra note 24, at 7-8; Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 121.
53. In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Tosti, 62 Bankr. 131, 134
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); Taylor v. Lineberry (In re Lineberry), 55 Bankr. 510, 515 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1985); In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 221 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); Hoffman & Murray,
supra note 43, at 19; Ravin & Rosen; supra note 24, at 8; Comment, supra note 23, at 529.
In states where the jury makes the actual property awards in a suit for divorce, the intent of
the jury becomes the focus of attention under the intent/factor approach. See Long v. West
(In re Long), 794 F.2d 928, 931 (4th Cir. 1986). The jury in Texas divorce proceedings decides
questions of facts relating to the allocation of community property (e.g., time of acquisition as
deciding whether property is separate or community), but the trial judge performs the equita-
ble division. McKnight, supra note 13, at 437.
54. In re Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667, 672 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985); Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5
Bankr. 317, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980); see supra note 13.
55. Holland v. Holland (In re Holland), 48 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984);
Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980).
1987]
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ment has labelled "alimony" to be nondischargeable under section
523(a)(5).5 6 Conversely, designating an award as a property settlement mili-
tates in favor of finding the award outside the scope of section 523(a)(5). 5 7
The bankruptcy court may also pay heed to recitals in the divorce decree
that a certain obligation is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.5 8  In In re
Tosti, 19 for example, the divorce court ordered the ex-husband to pay the ex-
wife's attorney's fees. The court also ordered the ex-husband to assume the
mortgage on the parties' house and to hold the ex-wife harmless thereon.
The divorce decree recited that the award of attorney's fees was not dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy; the decree was silent as to the dischargeability of
the mortgage assumption. Reading the decree in its entirety, the bankruptcy
court found an intent on the part of the divorce court that the mortgage
assumption could be dischargeable. 60 Based on this finding of an intent to
discharge, the bankruptcy court held that the mortgage assumption was not
in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.6'
Another factor that the courts apply is the debtor ex-spouse's treatment of
the award on income tax returns. Section 215 of the Internal Revenue
Code 62 allows a taxpayer to deduct the amount of "alimony or separate
maintenance payments" that the taxpayer has paid during the taxable
year.63 If a debtor in bankruptcy has deducted payments made pursuant to
an obligation arising from divorce, the bankruptcy court may hold the bal-
ance of the obligation nondischargeable. 64 Section 71(a) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code indicates that the obligee ex-spouse's gross income includes
alimony received. 65 Logically, such treatment by the recipient under an ob-
ligation ought to weigh in favor of nondischargeability as well. No cases,
however, have addressed the effect of the obligee ex-spouse's tax treatment of
the award.
56. See Long v. West (In re Long), 794 F.2d 928, 931 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Anderson, 62
Bankr. 448, 454 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
57. In re Sullivan, 62 Bankr. 465, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1986). In Sullivan the ex-wife
expressly waived any right to alimony. The obligation described as a property settlement and
found to be such arose when the ex-husband agreed to pay the ex-wife $16,000 per year for five
years for the construction of a house for the ex-wife and their children. Id.
58. One commentator strongly suggests that any settlement agreement or court order
clearly state whether the parties intend § 523(a)(5) to prevent discharge of each particular
obligation. Murphy, The Dischargeability in Bankruptcy of Debts for Alimony and Property
Settlements Arising From Divorce, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 69, 79 (1986).
59. 62 Bankr. 131 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
60. Id. at 134.
61. Id.
62. I.R.C. § 215 (1986).
63. Id. § 215(a). The Internal Revenue Code defines "alimony or separate maintenance
payment" as cash payments that (1) a spouse receives under a divorce or separation instrument
(including a written separation agreement); (2) the creating instrument for which does not
indicate the exclusion of such payments from the recipient spouse's gross income and the obli-
gor spouse's deduction of such payments under § 215 of the Internal Revenue Code; (3) are
not to occur while the obligor spouse and the obligee spouse are living together; and (4) are to
terminate upon the death of the obligee spouse. Id. § 71(b)(1), (2)(B).
64. See In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Harris v. Harris, 605
S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1986).
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Bankruptcy courts often look to the relative earning powers of the spouses
at the time the divorce court rendered its decree to decide whether the court
or the spouses intended that an award provide support for the obligee former
spouse. 66 The more the earning capacity of the obligor exceeds that of the
obligee, the courts reason, the more likely it is that the divorce court created
the awards in question for the purpose of meeting the support needs of the
obligee ex-spouse. 67 This finding, in turn, tends to make the obligation non-
dischargeable under section 523(a)(5). 68
Two additional factors involve an examination of the form of the award.
First, courts often check whether the ex-spouse will pay the obligation in
dispute in periodic installments or in one lump sum. An award contemplat-
ing periodic payments, all other factors being equal, probably will be consid-
ered "in the nature of" alimony or support;6 9 conversely, a court is likely to
determine that lump-sum arrangements create property divisions and thus,
become dischargeable in bankruptcy. 70 Second, the bankruptcy courts con-
sider whether the obligation terminates on the death or remarriage of the
obligee former spouse.7 1 Termination on either event indicates an intent to
provide support for the recipient until someone else is bound to support him
or her or until he or she no longer needs support. The courts, therefore, are
more likely to find that the obligation is not dischargeable under section
523(a)(5). 72 The opposite inference arises when the obligation is to continue
in full force regardless of the obligee ex-spouse's death or remarriage. 73
66. See In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (ex-husband was attorney,
and ex-wife possessed no marketable skills); In re Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667, 674 (Bankr. D. Md.
1985) (listing respective earning power as factor in § 523(a)(5) determination); In re Wesley,
36 Bankr. 526, 529-30 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (ex-husband's and ex-wife's earning capacities
roughly equal; obligation held discharged); Hoffman & Murray, supra note 43, at 23 (noting
court use of disparate earning capacity in § 523(a)(5) cases).
67. In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); In re Wesley, 36 Bankr. 526,
530 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); Hoffman & Murray, supra note 43, at 23.
68. In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); In re Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667,
672 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985); In re Wesley, 36 Bankr. 526, 530 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
69. See, e.g., In re Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667, 672 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985); Carlile v. Fox (In
re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980); Harris v. Harris, 605 S.W.2d 684, 687
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
70. In re Wesley, 36 Bankr. 526, 530 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). But see Long v. West (In re
Long), 794 F.2d 928, 931 (4th Cir. 1986) (lump-sum payment, but held nondischargeable).
71." In re Anderson, 62 Bankr. 448, 454 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); Carlile v. Fox (In re
Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980); Hoffman & Murray, supra note 43, at 20.
72. In re Anderson, 62 Bankr. 448, 454-55 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); In re Tosti, 62 Bankr.
131, 143 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); In re Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667, 672 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985);
Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980); Hoffman & Murray,
supra note 43, at 20.
73. See Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); In re Wesley, 36
Bankr. 526, 530 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
At least one bankruptcy court has referred to the obligor spouse's bad faith as a factor in
deciding dischargeability under section 523(a)(5). Holland v. Holland (In re Holland), 48
Bankr. 874, 877 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984). In Holland the husband, in contemplation of di-
vorce, agreed to assume and hold the wife harmless on a mortgage on which the spouses were
jointly liable. One month after executing the agreement the husband filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy. The bankruptcy court, in ruling on the dischargeability of the hold-harmless agree-
ment, implied that agreeing to assume joint debts with the present intention of discharging
them in bankruptcy weighs against their dischargeability under § 523(a)(5). Id. at 877. Other
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In summary, under the intent/factor approach to the question of dis-
chargeability under section 523(a)(5), the bankruptcy court will try to divine
the intent of the appropriate party or parties74 at the time the divorce court
rendered its decree. If the original purpose behind the award in dispute was
to establish a means of supporting the obligee ex-spouse, rather than as a
simple allocation of joint property and liabilities, then the obligation survives
the debtor's discharge. The factors discussed above merely represent exam-
ples of those that bankruptcy courts use in determining the parties' intent.
Different courts apply different factors and weigh them in different ways. 75
2. Approaches in the Fifth Circuit. Nunnally and Beyond
The law in the Fifth Circuit on the alimony exception to discharge begins
with In re Nunnally, 76 decided in 1975 under section 17(a)(7) of the old
Bankruptcy Act.77 In Nunnally the Texas divorce court awarded the wife
$41,779.41 as reimbursement for separate funds that the spouses used during
the marriage to benefit their community estate. 78 The court also ordered the
husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees of $5,000. The former husband
later filed for bankruptcy, without having paid the reimbursement or the
attorney's fees. The question before the Fifth Circuit court was whether
either or both of the awards in the divorce decree were excepted from dis-
charge in bankruptcy. The court held that both were.79
The court first analyzed the award for reimbursement. It pointed out that
divorce courts in Texas, in dividing community property between spouses,
may consider the parties' relative earning capacities, their future support
needs, and the benefits that the innocent spouse would gain if the marriage
were to continue. 80 From this observation the court expounded on the rela-
tionship between Texas family law and federal bankruptcy law in language
courts have dealt with the problem of the bad-faith assumption under § 523(a)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which states that a court will not discharge a debt for money, services, or
credit if the debt is a result of "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud .... " 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1982); see In re Brasher, 20 Bankr. 408, 409-10 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1982); In re Arterburn, 15 Bankr. 189, 191-92 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
74. The spouses, if the obligation in question originated in their agreement; the divorce
court, if the court imposed the obligation on the obligor spouse.
75. In In re Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985), the court enumerated eighteen
criteria that the various courts have considered in separating nondischargeable support obliga-
tions from dischargeable property divisions. Id. at 674-75.
76. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
77. See supra note 29.
78. Texas marital property law permits reimbursement for monies belonging to one mari-
tal estate (the husband's separate estate, the wife's separate estate, or the couple's community
estate) that a party or parties use to profit another marital estate. See Trevino v. Trevino, 555
S.W.2d 792, 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ) (reimbursed community es-
tate for payments on separate debts); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 56-58 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (reimbursed husband's separate estate
for monies invested for benefit of community estate). See generally J. McKNIGHT & W.
REPPY, supra note 9, at 173-79 (discussing the doctrine of reimbursement and related issues).
A right of reimbursement arises only upon dissolution of the marriage. Burton v. Bell, 380
S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1964).
79. Nunnally, 506 F.2d at 1027.
80. Id. at 1026.
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that, considering the court's result, suggests that virtually all property
awards from Texas divorce courts are not dischargeable. 8 '
The ex-husband's counsel presented the Nunnally court with a dilemma
that the court addressed in the sixth footnote of the opinion.8 2 As men-
tioned previously, Texas law does not approve of permanent, court-ordered
alimony.8 3 The ex-husband argued, in essence, that the reimbursement
award in reality constituted either alimony, therefore void under Texas law,
or a property division, therefore dischargeable in bankruptcy. Either way,
the ex-husband would owe nothing.8 4 The court noted that under Texas law
an award that looks like alimony remains valid if the court can trace it to
property that either spouse owns.85 The divorce court had left the ex-hus-
band with fifty-two percent of his Navy pension rights, out of which, the
court presumed, he could pay the reimbursement award.8 6 The Fifth Circuit
observed that reimbursement is not alimony; reimbursement merely restores
property advanced from one marital estate to another.8 7 The court empha-
sized the nonalimony qualities of the reimbursement award: a fixed amount
payable in one lump sum.88 The award for reimbursement, therefore, was
not void as court-ordered alimony.89
The Nunnally court followed similar reasoning with regard to the award
of attorney's fees. The court noted that divorce courts in Texas can award
attorney's fees in divorce proceedings based on the same factors used to di-
vide community property, including the respective abilities of the spouses to
support themselves. 90 In Nunnally the award of attorney's fees appeared
inseparable from the rest of the divorce decree; therefore, as with the award
of reimbursement, the ex-husband's discharge in bankruptcy did not affect
the award of counsel fees. 91
The next Fifth Circuit case to address the subject of divorce-award excep-
81. Id. at 1027. The court stated:
Thus, it is clear support in the future can play a significant role in the divorce
court's property division and that what may appear to be a mere division of
assets may in fact, under a Texas decree, contain a substantial element of ali-
mony-substitute, support or maintenance, however termed. The Texas Supreme
Court has recognized that: "Support payments ordered to be made after divorce
from the income of the husband's property, although considered alimony in
many jurisdictions, is not considered alimony in this State." Francis v. Francis,
412 S.W.2d 29, 32-33 (Tex. 1967). So recognizing, we should not be bound by
the label which the state places on a decree; we must look to its substance. Here
the award of $41,779.41 falls within the exception from discharge in Section 17.
Id.
82. Id. at 1027 n.6.
83. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
84. Nunnally, 506 F.2d at 1027 n.6.
85. Id.; see Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32-33 (Tex. 1967); McBean v. McBean, 371
S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no writ).








tions to discharge was Erspan v. Badgett. 92 Erspan made it clear that Nun-
nally still controlled within the circuit.93 The Erspan court used the same
broad method of analysis as did the court in Nunnally. In Erspan the di-
vorce court had ordered the ex-husband to pay the ex-wife one-half of all
Army pension payments that he would receive in the future. The Erspan
court took the opportunity to restate the exposition of law in Nunnally 94
and, without further discussion, likened the pension award to the awards in
Nunnally. The court concluded that the ex-husband's obligation to pay was
not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 95
In two recent cases the Fifth Circuit has shown a disinclination to follow
the Nunnally analysis regarding the alimony exception to discharge in bank-
ruptcy. The panel that decided In re Chandler 96 appears to have come up
with a new way of determining whether divorce-related obligations are dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy, a mode of analysis entirely independent of section
523(a)(5). In that case a Texas divorce court awarded the wife $450 per
month out of the husband's Army pension benefits "as [her] sole and sepa-
rate property."' 97 In deciding whether the ex-husband's subsequent bank-
ruptcy relieved him of liability on the obligation, the Fifth Circuit held that
the right to receive $450 per month became the ex-wife's property as of the
date of divorce, and as such did not constitute a debt that was dischargea-
ble. 98 The court found it unnecessary to discuss section 523(a)(5) because
the ex-wife did not seek to have pre-petition arrearages in the obligation
92. 647 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982).
93. 647 F.2d at 555.
94. Id. The court stated:
The essence of this Court's decision in Nunnally is that, regardless of how a state
may choose to define "alimony," a federal court, for purposes of applying the
federal bankruptcy laws, is not bound to the label that a state affixes to an
award, and that, consistent with the objectives of federal bankruptcy policy, the
substance of the award must govern.
Id.
95. Id.
96. 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 556.
98. Id. at 557. The divorce court had designated the ex-husband as trustee to receive the
ex-wife's interest in the pension and turn it over to her. The Fifth Circuit's point may be that
the monthly payments that the ex-wife was entitled to were not property of the bankruptcy
estate, since the ex-husband held no cognizable interest in her share at the commencement of
the bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), (b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The bankruptcy
court in In re Manners, 62 Bankr. 656 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986), seems to have used a similar
approach, although the Manners court emphasized that the Coast Guard, not the ex-husband,
had the duty to pay the ex-wife her share of the ex-husband's military pension following the
divorce. Id. at 658; see 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) (1982) (permitting state divorce courts to divide
military pension rights between spouses); 32 C.F.R. § 63 (1986) (establishing procedure
whereby recipient ex-spouse can receive his portion of military retirement benefits directly
from United States). The Manners court found the obligation not to be a debt within the
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). Manners, 62 Bankr. at 658.
Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit in Chandler may have meant that the ex-wife's interest in the
army pension no longer constituted a "personal liability of the debtor," so that a discharge in
bankruptcy could not affect the ex-husband's duty to remit the $450 each month. See 11
U.S.C. § 524(a)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). At any rate, the court could have employed




In In re Benich, 100 decided three months after Chandler, the Fifth Circuit
had to decide whether an ex-husband's agreement to make monthly pay-
ments to his ex-wife would survive the ex-husband's discharge in bank-
ruptcy. The ex-husband's promise came in exchange for the ex-wife's
waiving her community interest in the ex-husband's military pension. The
court cited In re Nunnally three times,' 0 ' but expressed approval of a far
more fact-based application of the alimony exception to discharge than the
Nunnally opinion contained. 10 2 The Benich panel discussed various charac-
teristics of a support-type award and apparently embraced the intent/factor
approach already discussed. 10 3 The court twice referred to the need to dis-
cern "the true nature of the debt" in determining dischargeability of divorce-
related awards.'0 4 The circuit court affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclu-
sion that the ex-husband's payments were for support and therefore nondis-
chargeable under section 523(a)(5). 10 5
The bankruptcy courts within the Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, have
long been willing to examine more closely the circumstances surrounding
Texas divorce awards in deciding dischargeability under section 523(a)(5).
In In re Fox 106 the divorce court had ordered the ex-husband to pay to his
former wife $250 per month, representing one-half of the ex-husband's mili-
tary pension. 10 7 The divorce court also ordered the ex-husband to make
child support payments of an unspecified amount. The ex-husband thereafter
filed a petition in bankruptcy, whereupon the ex-wife objected to the dis-
charge of the pension award. In response to In re Nunnally,10 8 the bank-
ruptcy court declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's decision for three
reasons. 10 9 First, the Fifth Circuit court decided Nunnally under section
17(a)(7) of the old Bankruptcy Act, not under section 523(a)(5) of the Bank-
99. Chandler, 805 F.2d at 557.
100. 811 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1987).
101. Id. at 945 & nn.8, 9.
102. Id. at 945.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. In an interesting dictum the court seemed to dovetail Benich with the court's
decision in In re Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986). According to the court, if the argu-
ment had been over the dischargeability of the ex-wife's interest in the pension benefits, rather
than the agreed-upon payments in lieu thereof, Benich would have become a different case.
Benich, 811 F.2d at 945. In that instance the court would not have discharged the ex-wife's
rights because her share in the pension would not be property of the bankruptcy estate. Id. For
a comparison of this idea with the court's expression in Chandler, see supra note 98.
106. 5 Bankr. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980).
107. Id. at 318. The couple's agreement, incorporated into the divorce decree, structured
the award in question in this way:
One half (1/2) of JAMES R. FOX'S United States Air Force retirement to be
paid in monthly installments of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) beginning
July 6, 1977, said award to be a debt against JAMES R. FOX in a negotiated
amount of Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00) based on his life expectancy
and other factors, evidenced by a note of even date in favor of BETTY L. FOX.
Id. (emphasis by the court).
108. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of Nunnally, see supra notes 76-91
and accompanying text.
109. Fox, 5 Bankr. at 320.
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ruptcy Code." 10 The Fox court argued that the Bankruptcy Act made it
easier on the obligee ex-spouse to prove the alimony exception to dis-
charge. "' According to the Fox court the old Bankruptcy Act only required
that considerations of support play some part in the creation of the obliga-
tion while the Bankruptcy Code requires that the award in question be "ac-
tually in the nature of" alimony or support; that is, that the award be mainly
for the purpose of providing essential support for the obligee ex-spouse." 2
Therefore, in the bankruptcy court's view, the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code overruled Nunnally to some extent.11 3 Second, the Fox court stated its
belief that the decision in Nunnally was insufficiently tied to its facts. 14 The
Fox court observed that Nunnally seemed to rest on the proposition that
Texas divorce courts make all property awards based on the respective sup-
port needs of the spouses.' 15 Under the Nunnally court's reasoning, there-
fore, the bankruptcy courts should except all Texas divorce awards from
discharge in bankruptcy, irrespective of the circumstances giving rise to the
obligation. 16 The Fox court asserted that Congress could not have intended
such a result. 1 7 Third, the court in Fox took issue with Nunnally's all-or-
nothing approach. 118 The Fox court saw no reason to believe that an obliga-
tion arising in divorce could not be partly dischargeable.' 1 9 The Fox court
stated that a bankruptcy court should find nondischargeable only that por-
tion of the award representing support or maintenance for the obligee ex-
spouse; any amount beyond that should be dischargeable.' 20
The Fox court decided that a more searching analysis of the facts was
appropriate.12' The court presented a list of factors for determining whether
the pension award was "actually in the nature of" support for Mrs. Fox, and
therefore excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5).122 These criteria
included: (1) the spouses' relative earning capacities; (2) their comparative
business opportunities; (3) their respective levels of education; (4) their
health; (5) their probable requirements for support in the future; (6) respon-
sibility in ending the marriage; and (7) the benefits accruing to the innocent
spouse if the marriage had not ended. 123 Applying the factors to the facts,
the court viewed as critical the former spouses' disparate future earning ca-
pacity: Mr. Fox had worked steadily during the marriage, while Mrs. Fox
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. For a comparison of § 523(a)(5) at the Bankruptcy Code and § 17(a) of the old
Bankruptcy Act, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.













had kept house and had little outside job experience.' 24 The court noted
also that the retirement payments were to begin at the time the child support
payments ended. The court took this as evidence that the support of Mrs.
Fox was a factor in the creation of the pension payment obligation. 25 The
court, therefore, held the pension payments to be in the nature of support
and nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5). 1 26
In In re Teter 127 the bankruptcy court had to determine the dis-
chargeability of the husband's agreement in the couple's property settlement
that caused a corporation, of which he was majority stockholder, to pay his
wife $125 per week.' 28 The court indicated that the Nunnally opinion had
created confusion.129 While examining the particulars of the case the Teter
court listed facts pointing toward the support nature of the weekly pay-
ments: that the ex-wife did not in fact have to work for the corporation in
order to get the money; that all five children of the marriage resided with the
ex-wife; that the former spouses were of unequal earning power; and, that
extrinsic evidence showed that the husband's main intention in agreeing to
the payments was to provide necessities for his wife.' 30 The bankruptcy
court concluded on the basis of the evidence that the wife's salary consti-
tuted payment of support and declared the obligation nondischargeable.13'
In In re Bell, 132 decided in 1986, the spouses executed a property settle-
ment that the divorce court incorporated into the divorce decree. In the
settlement the husband agreed to pay his wife an undisclosed amount in 121
monthly installments. The husband filed for bankruptcy, and the wife
sought to exclude the payment obligation from discharge under section
523(a)(5). As the Fox court had done, the Bell court listed several consider-
ations for determining whether the obligation in question was really one of
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court expressly disregarded the fact that the parties structured the obligation
as a debt. Id. For the structure of the award, see supra note 107. The substance of the award,
not its form, controls the analysis under § 523(a)(5). Ravin & Rosen, supra note 24, at 7. In
Fox Judge Robert A. Wright of the 225th Judicial District Court testified as an expert witness
on the reason behind the parties' use of the word "debt" in their agreement. At the time the
spouses executed the instrument, it was unclear whether, under Texas law, a court could divide
upon divorce the right to receive a military pension before the right had matured. Divorcing
spouses often placed pension divisions in the form of promissory notes to ensure their enforce-
ability. Fox, 5 Bankr. at 321. The Texas Supreme Court removed the uncertainty in Cearley v.
Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976), when it held that such contingent rights are divisible.
Id. at 666; see also McKnight, supra note 13, at 426-29 (discussion of Cearley).
127. 14 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
128. The settlement stated:
Husband agrees to cause Direct Fashions, Inc., (or at his election, some other
entity) to continue employment of Wife, but as a consultant, for a salary of
$125.00 per week with hospitalization and Social Security benefits. Wife . . .
agrees to work at such times and places (consistent with her position and age as
well as good taste) as her employer reasonably directs.
Id. at 435.
129. Id. at 436.
130. Id. The husband stated in his deposition that he agreed to have his corporation make
these payments in order to "help support her." Id.
131. Id.
132. 61 Bankr. 171 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
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support. 133 The court noted that the ex-husband's earning capacity, as an
attorney, far exceeded that of the ex-wife, who had simply maintained the
family home during the marriage.134 The fact that the obligation was paya-
ble in periodic installments, and that the agreement resulted from extended
arm's-length bargaining weighed in favor of nondischargeability under sec-
tion 523(a)(5).135 In addition, the ex-husband had included the amount paid
as an alimony deduction on his income tax. 136 The court held on the basis of
these considerations that the monthly payments constituted support of the
ex-wife, rather than a property division, and therefore were nondischarge-
able under the Bankruptcy Code.137
The bankruptcy courts in Texas, therefore, have employed a more prag-
matic, fact-based analysis in addressing the issue of dischargeability under
section 523(a)(5) than did the Fifth Circuit court in Nunnally. The courts in
Fox, Teter, and Bell in essence applied the intent/factor approach. The re-
mainder of this Comment describes and critically assesses a third way of
dealing with section 523(a)(5).
3. In re Calhoun
In 1983 the Sixth Circuit set out an entirely new method for determining
the dischargeability of marital property awards under the Bankruptcy Code.
In In re Calhoun 138 the husband agreed in contemplation of divorce to as-
sume five debts on which both spouses were personally liable, and to hold
the wife harmless on each. 139 After the divorce the husband declared bank-
ruptcy. The wife filed a complaint challenging the discharge of the hus-
band's hold-harmless obligations. Judge Cornelia Kennedy, writing for the
circuit court, criticized exclusive reliance on the parties' intent as determina-
133. Id. at 174-75. Factors of particular importance to the court in Bell were:
[T]he description and context of the disputed provisions in the divorce agree-
ment; whether a lump sum or terminable periodic payments were provided for;
... the relative earning power of the spouses, the adequacy of support absent the
payments in questions; the parties' negotiations and understanding of the provi-
sions, and the function which the award was intended to accomplish.
Id. at 175. For a discussion of the factors important in Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980), see supra text accompanying note 123.
134. Bell, 61 Bankr. at 174-75.
135. Id.
136. Id. For a discussion of the importance of how parties treat payment on their tax re-
turns, see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
137. Bell, 61 Bankr. at 175-76.
138. 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
139. Initially it was unclear whether the Calhoun rule would apply to obligations other
than assumptions of joint debts. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 4, 3.09[5].
Before long, however, the courts applying Calhoun extended its holding to cover all cases
under § 523(a)(5): "[T]o perceive it [Calhoun] only as a narrow assumption-of-debt case is to
view the world through the wrong end of a telescope." In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 220 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1985); see In re Singer, 787 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986) (Guy, J., concur-
ring); Taylor v. Lineberry (In re Lineberry), 55 Bankr. 510, 515 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985);
Deatherage v. Wallace (In re Deatherage), 55 Bankr. 268, 271 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
Courts have yet to decide whether the Calhoun analysis will apply in cases filed under chapters
11, 12, or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
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tive of whether the award is dischargeable.' 40 In addition to the difficulties
inherent in discerning intent,' 4 1 the Calhoun court found that section
523(a)(5) by its language does not turn on what the parties intended.' 42 The
court pinpointed the fundamental problem of deciding which awards consti-
tute support and which do not: all obligations created on divorce to some
extent support the obligee ex-spouse, but not all should survive discharge
under section 523(a)(5).143
The heart of Calhoun is its three-part test for determining whether a given
marital property obligation is dischargeable in bankruptcy. 14 4  First, the
state divorce court, or the spouses, if the obligation in question arose by
agreement, must have intended to create the obligation as a means of sup-
porting the obligee ex-spouse.' 45 In resolving the question of intent the
bankruptcy court may refer to the form and content of the divorce decree,
factors indicating the propriety of ordering support payments, as well as ex-
trinsic evidence of the parties' negotiating stances and understanding of the
provision in question. 146
Second, the obligation must in fact have the intended effect of meeting the
obligee ex-spouse's and any children's day-to-day needs. 14 7 Here the bank-
ruptcy court must consider the obligee's support needs as compared with his
ability to discharge those needs through independent support funds and the
obligee's own assets.' 48 The court should also consider the likely effect on
140. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109.
141. See In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 221 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (court must determine
the intent of each party under circumstances in which neither party is concerned with the legal
characterization of the obligations).
142. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109-10. Only those awards "actually in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support" survive discharge in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982).
143. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1108. The court stated:
The initial difficulty is that every assumption of a joint loan obligation in a di-
vorce settlement at least indirectly contributes to support. The former spouse is
relieved of payments on that debt and thus has funds for other purposes includ-
ing necessary support. Support in this broad sense results even if the assump-
tion of joint marital debts is actually a division of property. It is clear from the
statute and legislative history that Congress could not have intended that all
assumptions of joint debts would be nondischargeable.
Id.; see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 693 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[m]oney
not spent for one purpose becomes available for other purposes").
144. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109-10. Some courts describe the Calhoun rule as a four-part
test, dividing the query into reasonableness and the setting of a reasonable dischargeable
amount of the award into two separate steps. See In re Delaine, 56 Bankr. 460, 466 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1985); In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 221 n.17 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985). Under either
analysis the result is the same. Freeburger & Bowels, What Divorce Court Giveth, Bankruptcy
Court Taketh Away. A Review of the Dischargeability of Marital Support Obligations, 24 J.
FAM. L. 587, 609 n.100 (1985).
145. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109.
146. Id. at 1108 n.7, 1109. The court specified several appropriate factors for considera-
tion. Id. at 1108 n.7. The Calhoun court's list of factors substantially parallels those in Fox
and Bell. Carlisle v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980); In re Bell,
61 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); see In re Singer, 787 F.2d 1033, 1036 (6th Cir.
1986) (Guy, J., concurring).




the obligee of ordering the obligation discharged in bankruptcy. 149
Finally, if the first two tests are met, the bankruptcy court must determine
whether the amount of the award is so far beyond that dictated by tradi-
tional notions of support as to be patently unreasonable.' 50 At this point the
court will look to the debtor ex-spouse's present ability to comply with the
obligation.'51 To except from discharge the entire amount of an obligation
that, although created with the intent and having the effect of providing sup-
port for the obligee ex-spouse, far exceeds the debtor's ability to pay, would
do violence to the bankruptcy policy of extending to the debtor a fresh start
on life. 152 If the court finds that the amount of the obligation is excessive, it
must determine the portion of the award that appears reasonable in view of
the debtor's post-bankruptcy financial condition. 153 Again, the court should
refer to general state-law principles to guide it in fixing the limit on dis-
chargeability. 1 4 The Calhoun court was sensitive to the fact that a bank-
ruptcy court's determination of what is reasonable as support may have the
practical effect of modifying the divorce decree, which federal courts lack
jurisdiction to do.' 55 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court cannot avoid the
inquiry into reasonableness, given Congress's mandates that only a divorce
award "actually in the nature of" support is nondischargeable, and that a
state court's determination of what is necessary for the nondebtor spouse's
support is not controlling on the question of discharge.156 The circuit court
reversed and remanded to the bankruptcy court for reconsideration of
whether the ex-husband's obligation was dischargeable under section
523(a)(5). 157
III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In re Nunnally 158 cannot stand as the Fifth Circuit's definitive word on
the alimony exception to discharge in bankruptcy. As the court in In re
Fox 159 pointed out, the Nunnally court's application of law to facts leaves
149. Id. In deciding whether the obligation in question in fact provides necessary support,
the bankruptcy court should define "necessary" with reference to the former spouses' standard
of living during the marriage. In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 224 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
150. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1110.
151. Id.
152. Id. For discussion of the bankruptcy policy of providing a fresh start, see supra note
4.
153. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1110.
154. Id. The court in Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980), also
believed that a court could divide a marital property award into dischargeable and nondis-
chargeable portions. Id. at 320. Indeed the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 confirms the idea. See 124 CONG. REC. 32,399 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards)
(property award is dischargeable under section 523(a)(5) "to the extent that [the obligation] is
not actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support").
155. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109-10 n.10.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 111.
158. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of Nunnally, see supra notes 76-91
and accompanying text.
159. Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980).
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much to be desired. 160 The fact that Texas law does not permit alimony as
such does not answer the question of dischargeability. 16 1 In dividing prop-
erty and debts, Texas divorce courts may consider the same elements that
courts in alimony states refer to in awarding support payments.162 The sub-
stance of the award, not its label, determines its dischargeability. 16 3 At this
juncture, the Nunnally court simply concluded that the award, a reimburse-
ment to the wife's separate estate, was not dischargeable. 164 Not only did
the court fail to heed its own advice in not examining the substance of this
particular award,' 65 but it engaged in faulty logic. The argument in Nun-
nally seems to proceed in this manner: Texas divorce courts may consider
support factors in creating obligations between spouses; some Texas divorce
obligations, therefore, are based on support and are nondischargeable in
bankruptcy; this obligation (or all obligations), therefore, is (are) nondis-
chargeable.
Apart from the flaws of reasoning in Nunnally, the case's result also ap-
pears suspect. An award of reimbursement is simply the restoration of a
specific dollar amount that one marital estate advanced for the benefit of
another.166 In effect a reimbursement award stands as an order compelling
payment of a debt.' 67 Two bankruptcy courts have held reimbursement-
type awards dischargeable in bankruptcy. 68 In In re Lineberry 169 the di-
vorce court awarded the wife $24,353.65 as representing her contribution to
the family's living expenses in excess of what the husband contributed. The
bankruptcy court treated the award as a judgment debt in favor of the wife
and declared it discharged. 170 In re Coffman 171 dealt with the dis-
chargeability under section 523(a)(5) of a $1,250 award constituting the ex-
husband's sole property (inheritance from his mother received during his
marriage) used to help pay the mortgage on the spouses' home. The debtor
ex-wife sought to have the obligation discharged in bankruptcy. The bank-
ruptcy court found the award to be in the nature of a property division, not a
support obligation, and therefore not included in the alimony exception to
160. Id. at 320.
161. Nunnally, 506 F.2d at 1027; see supra note 81.
162. Nunnally, 506 F.2d at 1027.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See In re Teter, 14 Bankr. 434, 436 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
166. See supra note 78.
167. See Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The Horlock court stated that:
it should be kept in mind that in seeking reimbursement the appellee does not
ask to share in the actual assets which have been determined to be community
property. Rather, the appellee seeks to recover an amount substantially equal to
the amount of capital which he brought into the marriage as separate property
and which he utilized for the benefit of the community estate.
Id.
168. Taylor v. Lineberry (In re Lineberry), 55 Bankr. 510, 515 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985);
In re Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667, 675 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985).
169. 55 Bankr. 510 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
170. Id. at 515. In Texas, however, separate property used to meet family living expenses
is not reimbursable. Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 502-03, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 (1953).




Both of the basic approaches to section 523(a)(5), the intent/factor
method and the Calhoun method, appear superior to the Fifth Circuit's han-
dling of the issue in Nunnally. The intent/factor approach has gained a foot-
hold among bankruptcy courts in Texas, 173 as it has among bankruptcy
courts in the United States generally. 174 This mode of analysis comports
with Congress's intent that a section 523(a)(5) case turn on the specific facts
and circumstances surrounding the individual award in controversy.17 5 Dis-
cerning the parties' intent is not enough, however, as section 523(a)(5)
speaks not of intent but of awards "actually in the nature of alimony, mainte-
nance, or support."' 176 The Bankruptcy Code, therefore, seems to require
further inquiry into the actual effect of the obligation on the obligee ex-
spouse. The Calhoun approach offers this added dimension.
The bankruptcy courts and commentators have hailed In re Calhoun 177 as
something of a breakthrough in analyzing the alimony exception to dis-
charge in bankruptcy. 178 Not only have courts inside 179 and outside' 80 the
Sixth Circuit followed the Calhoun test, but so has a Texas bankruptcy
court.181 In In re Holland 182 the husband and wife reached a property set-
tlement agreement in which the husband agreed to assume a bank debt se-
cured by a lien on the family's car. The parties also agreed to give the car to
the wife. One month after the divorce the husband filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy, and the wife sought to have the husband's debt assumption excepted
from discharge under section 523(a)(5). The bankruptcy court listed the
three Calhoun prerequisites for finding a divorce obligation nondischarge-
able in bankruptcy: intent to support, effect of support, and overall reasona-
172. Id. at 675.
173. See supra notes 106-137 and accompanying text.
174. See Ravin & Rosen, supra note 24, at 8.
175. See Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1111 (6th Cir. 1983).
176. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982) (emphasis added).
177. 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of Calhoun, see supra notes 138-157
and accompanying text.
178. In In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985), the court remarked: "Judge
Kennedy's writing [in Calhoun] is a carefully detailed construct, a literal handbook for bank-
ruptcy judges ...." Id. at 220. Weintraub and Resnick describe Calhoun as a "landmark
decision . . . significantly alter[ing] the bankruptcy court's role involving domestic relations
issues.. . ." B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 4, 11 3.09[5]. The court in Williams v.
Holt (In re Holt), 40 Bankr. 1009, 1113 (S.D. Ga. 1984), praised the Calhoun court's "detailed
and scholarly" opinion.
179. In re Erler, 60 Bankr. 220, 221-23 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986); Brock v. Barlow (In re
Brock), 58 Bankr. 797, 806-09 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986); Deatherage v. Wallace (In re Deather-
age), 55 Bankr. 268, 271-72 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Wright, 51 Bankr. 630, 632-33
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); In re Elder, 48 Bankr. 414, 417-18 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); John-
son v. Seta (In re Seta), 45 Bankr. 8, 9 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); In re Lelak, 38 Bankr. 164,
167-69 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); In re Plaugher, 37 Bankr. 760, 763-65 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984); In re Brown, 37 Bankr. 295, 299-300 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Wesley, 36 Bankr.
526, 529 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); Crouse v. Cleaver (In re Cleaver), 36 Bankr. 516, 518-19
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
180. In re Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. 641, 646-49 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
181. Holland v. Holland (In re Holland), 48 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984).
182. Id. at 874.
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bleness with respect to the debtor's present ability to pay. 183 The court
listed eight factors pertinent to the question of intent. 184 Relying largely on
the fact that the husband was earning twice as much money as the wife, the
court found an intent to create a support obligation.185 The Holland court
also found that the loan assumption had the effect of providing necessary
support for Mrs. Holland. 186 To meet her daily needs and those of her child
Mrs. Holland had to work outside the home, for which she needed an auto-
mobile free from the risk of foreclosure.1 87 Finally, the court held it was not
unreasonable to require Mr. Holland to pay the debt he had agreed to as-
sume since his earning capacity clearly exceeded that of his former wife, and
his financial condition had not substantially changed since the time of the
divorce. 188 The court, therefore, held that the loan assumption was not dis-
charged in bankruptcy. 189
In spite of the advantages that the Calhoun doctrine holds over other ap-
proaches, two objections persist. Both concern Calhoun's obtrusiveness into
state domestic-relations law. 190 The first objection questions the third test
for a nondischargeable award, which requires the bankruptcy court to decide
whether the amount of the particular obligation is reasonable in light of the
debtor ex-spouse's present ability to fulfill it, and if it is not, to fix a reason-
able limit on the amount that a court may exclude from discharge. 191 Find-
ing part of an award dischargeable and part nondischargeable reduces the
liability of the debtor ex-spouse and thus effectively modifies the divorce
court's decree. 192 One line of argument criticizes the third test of Calhoun
by asserting that section 523(a)(5) does not permit a bankruptcy court to
inquire into the reasonableness of a divorce obligation or to separate an
award into dischargeable and nondischargeable parts. 193  The Calhoun
183. Id.; see Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (6th. Cir. 1983).
184. Holland, 48 Bankr. at 876. The court's factors included: (1) the existence of children
of the marriage; (2) the ex-spouses' comparative income levels; (3) whether the obligation in
controversy attached to the community property awarded to the debtor ex-spouse; (4) whether
the nondebtor ex-spouse needed support at the time of divorce; (5) whether the dependence on
the debtor ex-spouse during the marriage handicapped the nondebtor ex-spouse in gaining
outside employment following the divorce; (6) the age and health of the nondebtor ex-spouse;
(7) the ex-spouses' respective levels of wealth; and (8) whether the divorce decree itself re-
flected an intent to create a support obligation rather than a division of property. Id.





190. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 4, 3.09[5].
191. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d. 1103, 1110 (6th Cir. 1983).
192. In Deatherage v. Wallace (In re Deatherage), 55 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1985), the bankruptcy court asserted that the third test of Calhoun did not compel bankruptcy
courts to act as "super-divorce" courts. Id. at 271 n.3. The Calhoun analysis, the court con-
tinued, does not review the reasonableness of divorce awards; it merely separates dischargeable
portions from nondischargeable ones. Id. This type of hair-splitting formalism does not aid
the discussion. Clearly the effect of finding only half of a $1,000 divorce award reasonably
necessary to support the nondebtor ex-spouse is to create a $500 award where a $1,000 award
existed before.
193. See In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 225 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985). Although following
Calhoun, the Helm court noted that § 523(a)(5) "draws no dischargeability distinctions be-
19871
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court, however, successfully answered this criticism: bankruptcy courts
must limit the amount of an award excepted from discharge to that portion
that is truly for the support of the obligee ex-spouse. Any amount beyond
that is discharged in bankruptcy. Reexamination of state divorce decrees is
unavoidable because state law cannot control the question of dis-
chargeability under section 523(a)(5). 194
Others attack Calhoun's third test by arguing that the court misplaced its
focus. 195 The extent to which a divorce obligation is nondischargeable
should depend on the support needs of the obligee ex-spouse, not on the
debtor ex-spouse's ability to pay. 196 This argument rejects the notion, im-
plicit in Calhoun, that the bankruptcy court must in each case balance the
policies of providing the debtor with a fresh start and seeing that the debtor's
former spouse and children are taken care of. Congress must strike that bal-
ance, and it has done so in section 523(a)(5), which excepts from discharge
in bankruptcy all obligations arising upon divorce to the extent that they are
"actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support." 197 Section
523(a)(5) says nothing of the debtor's ability or inability to meet the obliga-
tion, nor of the bankruptcy court's power to work equity in the individual
case. By contrast, section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excludes
from discharge debts for government education loans, expressly permits the
bankruptcy court to consider the circumstances of the individual debtor in
passing on the dischargeability of such a debt. 198 The absence of similar
language in section 523(a)(5) implies that Congress did not intend that bank-
ruptcy courts apply equitable considerations in cases involving the alimony
exception to discharge. 199
The second major objection to the Calhoun rule is that bankruptcy courts
should not consider the former spouses' present circumstances in deciding
whether section 523(a)(5) applies. 200 Calhoun does this at two points: in the
second test, when the court looks to the nondebtor ex-spouse's current needs
tween 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' support; either an obligation is for support, and there-
fore nondischargeable, or it is not." Id.; see also In re Griffin, 39 Bankr. 112, 114 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1984) (practical problems of letting federal courts review decisions of state di-
vorce courts).
194. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109 n.10.
195. See In re Yeates, 44 Bankr. 575, 579 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir.
1986).
196. Id.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982); Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 906
n.6 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Yeates, 44 Bankr. 575, 579 (D. Utah 1984) ("[T]he bankruptcy
court must simply determine whether a particular debt is in the nature of alimony, mainte-
nance, or support. If so, it cannot be discharged."), aff'd, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986).
198. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1982). The bankruptcy court is to order a government edu-
cational loan debt discharged in bankruptcy if not to do so would "impose an undue hardship
on the debtor and the debtor's dependents." Id.
199. In re Comer, 27 Bankr. 1018, 1020-21 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 723 F.2d 737 (9th
Cir. 1984); see In re Griffin, 39 Bankr. 112, 114 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1984).
200. The objection discussed in the previous paragraph focused on whether a bankruptcy
court should reexamine a divorce award for reasonableness, and if so, whether the debtor ex-
spouse's financial condition is at all relevant to the inquiry. The second objection concedes the
bankruptcy court's power to hold part of an award dischargeable, but questions whether post-
divorce changes in either ex-spouse's wealth or earning capacity should have a bearing on the
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and assets; 20 1 and in the third test, which emphasizes the debtor ex-spouse's
present capacity to pay the obligation. 20 2  The courts are split,203 even
within the Sixth Circuit,20 4 as to whether Calhoun is correct in weighing
post-divorce changes in the ex-spouses' financial situations. Those who
would discount the parties' present circumstances and test the dis-
chargeability of a divorce obligation at the time of the decree argue that to
allow bankruptcy courts an ongoing right to review the propriety of divorce
awards constitutes too great an interference with the jurisdiction of state
courts. 20 5 If the ex-spouses' financial positions have changed materially
since the time of the divorce decree so that the original award no longer
reflects the obligee's needs or the obligor's ability to pay, the obligor's rem-
edy should lie in the state court with a petition for modification of the award,
not in the bankruptcy court.20 6
This argument fails to take into account the need to determine the extent
court's decision. Although these two criticisms are related, they attack different parts of the
Calhoun rule, and for this reason, this Comment addresses them separately.
201. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The distribu-
tion or existence of other property, for example, may make the continuing assumption of joint
debts unnecessary for support, as might drastic changes in the former spouse's capabilities for
self-support.").
202. Id. at 1110 n.l. The court declared:
If the circumstances of the debtor have changed from the time the obligation to
the former spouse to pay joint debts was created so as to make such support now
inequitable the bankruptcy court may consider the debtor's current general abil-
ity to pay insofar as it relates to the continuing obligation to assume the joint
debts.
Id. (emphasis in original).
203. Compare Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1987) (changed circum-
stances of either ex-spouse irrelevant) and Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986)
(changed circumstances of either ex-spouse irrelevant) and In re Quinn, 44 Bankr. 622, 624 n.5
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (obligee ex-spouse's present needs irrelevant) and In re Comer, 27
Bankr. 1018, 1020-21 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (changed circumstances of either ex-spouse irrele-
vant), aff'd, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1984) with In re Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. 641, 646-47 (S.D.
Ga. 1983) (debtor ex-spouse's present ability to pay is relevant) and In re Warner, 5 Bankr.
434, 442-43 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (obligee ex-spouse's present needs are relevant) (decided
under former Bankruptcy Act, but with reference to Bankruptcy Code).
204. Compare In re White, 55 Bankr. 878, 883 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (debtor ex-
spouse's current ability to pay irrelevant) and In re Brown, 46 Bankr. 612, 614 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1985) (changed circumstances of either ex-spouse irrelevant) with In re Helm, 48 Bankr.
215, 225 & n.30 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (debtor ex-spouse's current ability to pay is relevant)
and Gerdes v. Gerdes, 33 Bankr. 860, 870 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (changed circumstances of
both ex-spouses are relevant).
205. Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 907 & n.7 (1 1th Cir. 1985); In re Bell,
61 Bankr. 171, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Ravin & Rosen, supra note 24, at 15.
206. Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 907 n.8 (I 1th Cir. 1985); In re Bell, 61
Bankr. 171, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Ravin & Rosen, supra note 24, at 15; Recent Develop-
ments, supra note 4, at 116. Of the circuit courts that have addressed the issue, only the Sixth
Circuit has held that bankruptcy courts must consider the ex-spouses' changed circumstances,
if any, in deciding whether divorce related awards are dischargeable under § 523(a)(5). Long
v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1110 n.l (6th Cir. 1983). Three other circuits
have held that changed circumstances are irrelevant. See Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801,
803-04 (2d Cir. 1987); Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Harrell,
754 F.2d at 906-07. The Tenth Circuit found it unnecessary to reach the question of changed
circumstances in In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 n.3 (10th Cir. 1986). Given this disagree-




to which support is the actual basis of a divorce award. An obligation cre-
ated entirely for the support of the obligee ex-spouse might, because of im-
provements in the obligee's wealth or earning capacity, cease to be necessary
in its entirety for the obligee's support. Such an award is no longer wholly in
the nature of alimony or support, and a court may discharge some of it in
bankruptcy. The policy of construing exceptions to discharge narrowly, in
favor of the debtor,20 7 recommends such a reading of section 523(a)(5). The
bankruptcy court, therefore, must consider any post-divorce changes in the
nondebtor ex-spouse's support needs or ability to satisfy those needs. This
examination occurs in the second test of Calhoun.20 8  Looking to the
debtor's changed circumstances, however, appears less defensible, since sec-
tion 523(a)(5) does not permit attention to the debtor's ability to pay.20 9
The courts should adopt a middle position that looks to the present needs
and assets of the obligee ex-spouse, but disregards the debtor ex-spouse's
capacity to fulfill the obligation in question. 2 10
IV. CONCLUSION
Unless Congress amends the Bankruptcy Code,2 1' this Comment recom-
mends that the Fifth Circuit adopt a modified form of the Calhoun approach
to section 523(a)(5). In re Nunnally relied on peculiar reasoning and
207. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915); Shepherd v. McDonald, 157 F.2d 467,
469 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 802 (1947); Koltman v. Hammill (In re Hammill),
61 Bankr. 555, 556 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); Quadras Ltd. v. Konchan (In re Konchan), 36
Bankr. 393, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984).
208. See Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983).
209. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
210. The district court adopted this stance in In re Yeates, 44 Bankr. 575, 580 (D. Utah
1984). On appeal the Tenth Circuit expressly declined to address the issue, since the ex-wife's
financial status had not changed since the divorce. In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1986). While the obligee ex-spouse's circumstances at the time of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing are pertinent to the determination of how much of the award is reasonably necessary for
support, the debtor ex-spouse's current situation is not material. Surely Congress contem-
plated that the debtor's financial condition would worsen as bankruptcy approached. Still,
Congress made no allowance for the debtor's dire straits in § 523(a)(5). Yeates, 44 Bankr. at
580.
An important exception to the applicability of the "present needs test" should be divorce-
related obligations in which the debtor ex-spouse is in arrears. See In re Troxell, 67 Bankr.
328, 331 n.3 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986); McArtar v. Rowles (In re Rowles), 66 Bankr. 628, 631
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986). As the Rowles court pointed out, to make the obligee ex-spouse
prove that the past-due payments are currently necessary for his or her support would enable
the debtor to stop making payments under an obligation that might clearly be in the nature of
support, force the obligee to support himself or herself by other means, and then argue in
bankruptcy that the arrearages are now unnecessary to ensure the obligee's support. Rowles,
66 Bankr. at 631. Congress could not have intended to permit such subterfuge. Id. The Cal-
houn opinion itself contains language supporting this observation. See Calhoun, 715 F.2d at
1109 n.9. The Calhoun analysis, therefore, applies only to the dischargeability of payments
that are not yet due.
211. Commentators have suggested two alternatives for clarifying the alimony exception to
discharge. Judge Lee has urged Congress to provide a definition of "alimony, maintenance, or
support" in the Code. Lee, Case Comment, In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1984) Dis-
chargeability of Debt: Alimony, Maintenance, or Support, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 175, 178 (1976).
Another observer would have section 523(a)(5) made more specific as to which kinds of debts
are nondischargeable. Comment, supra note 25, at 538-39.
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reached a result that is at best debatable. Furthermore, the bankruptcy
courts in Texas have not felt compelled to follow Nunnally, but have ex-
plored new ways of dealing with the alimony exception to discharge in bank-
ruptcy. The Fifth Circuit should adopt the first and second tests of the
Calhoun analysis. As for the third test, the court should ask whether the
entire divorce obligation in controversy is reasonably necessary to meet the
day-to-day needs of the obligee ex-spouse, based on that spouse's present and
projected requirements and capacity to fill them by means independent of
the award in question. If the answer is no, the bankruptcy court should
decide how much of the award is "actually in the nature of alimony, mainte-
nance, or support" 2 12 and hold only that portion nondischargeable.
212. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982).
1987]

